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ONE TAX PIECE OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS:
CAN THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD USE
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE TO BAIL OUT THE
AILING SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY?
Beverly L Moran*
I. INTRODUCTION
N Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner' the Sixth
Circuit delves into a little known aspect of the savings and
loan crisis-the attempt by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
to use the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") to help bolster its
failing constituent thrifts. In the course of its analysis, the Sixth
Circuit must articulate the requirements for transforming an
economic loss into a deductible tax loss. In reaching its
conclusion, the Sixth Circuit finds itself at odds with the Tax
Court 2 the District of Columbia Circuit, 3 the Fifth Circuit,4
and, at least to some extent, with two district courts as well.'
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; A.B.,
Vassar College (1977); J.D., University of Pennsylvania (1981); LL.M. (Tax-
ation), New York University (1986).
The author thanks Professor William Rands, Professor Daniel Schneider,
Professor Alphonse Squillante, Cassandra Jones, Madeline McGuckin, Chris-
tian O'Neal and Sharon Zealey for their helpful comments.
1. 890 F.2d 848 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 40 (1990).
2. See Leader Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Memphis v. Commissioner, 57
T.C.M. (CCH) 846 (1989); Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 372
(1988), rev'd, 890 F.2d 848 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 40 (1990);
Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 405 (1988), aff'd,
896 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1990); San Antonio Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 55
T.C.M. (CCH) 813 (1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1989).
3. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Commissioner, 896 F.2d 580 (D.C.
Cir. 1990).
4. San Antonio Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577 (5th Cir.
1989).
5. See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Temple v. United States, 694 F.
Supp. 230 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1989) and Centennial
Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 1389 (N.D. Tex. 1988),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 887 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. granted,
111 S. Ct. 40 (1990).
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Not to be outdone, these courts are also in conflict with each
other in at least some part of their judgments. That so many
learned jurists have reached so many different results on
essentially the same set of facts points to the novelty and
difficulty of the questions raised. What are the facts that led to
such diverse conclusions?
By now, we are all painfully familiar with the catastrophe
that faced the savings and loan industry in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. 6 Traditionally, the savings and loans earned their
incomes by loaning money received as deposits to individuals so
that they could purchase homes. 7 As the thrifts approached the
1980s, their portfolios were filled with loans made in an earlier
era when home owners paid mortgage rates of eight, six and
even four percent. Those rates were sufficient to maintain the
thrifts' positive balance sheets as long as the interest the thrifts
paid their depositors was lower still. But, with the raging inflation
of the late 1970s, the thrifts were faced with depositors who
demanded interest at ten and twelve percent. Of course, mortgage
rates during that period had climbed to as high as eighteen
percent, but there were not enough takers at the higher rates to
avoid a hemorrhage of dollars from the thrifts' coffers. There
was simply no way to make money when savers received more
from the thrifts for their deposits than the thrifts were taking
in from homeowners on their mortgage loans. 8
Cash flow problems caused by fluctuating interest rates were
only part of many factors affecting each thrift's bottom line.
Climbing interest rates also reduced the net worth of each thrift's
inventory, those low interest loans maintained in each savings
6. See Nash, Bush Says Savings Bailout May Not Be Enough, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 12, 1989, § D, at 13, col. 1; Reuters, Banks Lost $744 Million
In Quarter, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1989, § D, at 7, col. 1; Hayes, U.S. Seeks
Buyers for Seized Assets, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1989, § D, at 5, col. 1; Nash,
Savings Loss is Put at $3.78 Billion, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1988, § D, at 11,
col. 1.
7. See Hayes, More Pain for Texas Thrift Units, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10,
1987, § D, at 1, col. 6; Berg, Fixed-Rate Mortgages Held Threat to Lenders,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1986, § D, at 1, col. 4.
8. See supra notes 2-5 for case descriptions of how the savings and loan
crisis affected the individual thrifts involved in the litigation before the courts.
For more information on the crisis in general, see White, The S&L Debacle:
How it Happened and Why Further Reforms are Needed, CATO REv. Bus.
& Gov'T (Winter 1990).
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and loans' portfolio. This was because no one wanted to purchase
loans that paid low interest rates unless the seller was willing to
discount the face value enough to make the loan competitive in
the high interest market. 9 Hence, along with cash flow problems,
the thrifts had to contend with low yield inventories that were
rapidly losing value.'0
To address the challenges described above, some businesses
might start by selling off inventory. Inventory sales are attractive
because they raise revenues to pay impatient creditors, help the
business take funds from losing investments and place them in
more productive ventures, and generate tax deductions that
create the possibility of even more cash from tax refunds."
However, Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations made
this alternative almost impossible for many thrifts.
9. For example, if Alphonse loaned $100,000 to Barbara at 8% interest,
Alphonse would expect to receive $8,000 a year in interest payments (assuming
that no principal was paid during the year). So long as interest rates stay at
8%, Alphonse should be able to sell the loan for the full $100,000 principal
because the purchaser could not expect to make more from his investment by
placing $100,000 anywhere else.
When interest rates rise, however, buying Alphonse's loan becomes less
attractive because the prospective purchaser can get more return for his money
elsewhere. If interest rates rise to 16%, then the buyer would only want to
pay $50,000 for Alphonse's $100,000 loan because he can lend his $50,000 on
the open market and receive the same $8,000 a year at 16% that Alphonse
now receives on his $100,000 loan.
Of course, although a smart buyer would never pay the full $100,000 in a
16% market, he would be willing to pay something more than $50,000 in
order to take into account the fact that, over time, he would receive not only
interest but also $100,000 principal. For purposes of simplicity, this additional
factor is not considered in this example.
10. This article does not discuss the other factors that contributed to the
savings and loan crisis, such as the move by thrifts into riskier investment
(such as commercial real estate) and the thieving that some thrifts experienced.
See Stevenson, Six Indicted in California Savings Case, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12,
1989, § D, at 1, col. 6; Kilborn, Reagan Advisers Blame U.S. Policy for
Savings Crisis, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1989, § A, at 1, col. 6; Bartlett, Bad
Real Estate Loans Hurt Northeast Banks, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1988, § D,
at 1, col. 4.
11. Net operating losses allow a taxpayer to use losses in one year to
offset gains earned in a prior year, thus generating tax refunds in the loss
year. See I.R.C. § 172 (1988). For a discussion of the net operating losses,
see B. BITrKER & M. MCMAHON, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATIoN OF INDVImUALS
15.2 (1988).
Winter 1991]
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In return for the benefit of federally insured deposits, savings
and loans were subject to regulation by the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board ("FHLBB," "Bank Board," or "Board"). In
addition to numerous other requirements, the FHLBB forced
each thrift to file semiannual reports on its financial condition
in conformity with FHLBB regulations.' 2 Under these "regulatory
accounting principles" thrifts were required to maintain a
predetermined net worth or face closure by the Bank Board. 3
One component of a thrift's net worth was the value of the
loans it maintained. This loan value was established on acquisition
and did not change as long as the thrift held the loan and the
borrower continued to pay. In other words, so long as the loan
was current, the thrift kept the loan on its books at the original
acquisition value even when the loan's actual value had
substantially declined. If the thrift sold the loan at a deflated
price, however, then its net worth declined to reflect the reduced
value of its assets. Hence, each sale had the potential to force
a closure by lowering the thrift's net worth to below its pre-
established floor. As a result of this requirement, the thrifts
could not take advantage of the benefits they might have derived
from selling their depreciated loans because a sale of the devalued
loans would trigger a reduction in net worth which, in turn,
might force an FHLBB closure.
As the savings and loan crisis burgeoned, the FHLBB could
no longer ignore this dilemma. Its thrifts had heavy economic
losses as a result of the general decline in loan values. Yet its
own regulations kept the thrifts from taking advantage of these
losses. If the thrifts sold the loans they could raise cash if only
through tax refunds. But, if the loans were sold, the Bank Board
might have to shut the thrifts down. At some point the FHLBB
needed to find a solution: How to allow the thrifts to generate
tax losses without book losses so that the thrifts could obtain
refunds without having to lower their net worth for accounting
purposes. The FHLBB's solution was to allow thrifts to swap
mortgages amongst themselves. It is these mortgage swaps that
12. FHLBB, ANNOTATED MANUAL OF STATUTES & REGULATIONS § 563c
(1990) (Accounting Requirements 1205 to 1209h).
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1425a (1988), repealed by Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-73, title VII, § 716, 103
Stat. 421.
[Vol. 22
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are the subject of Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner1 4
and the other cases cited above.' 5
II. THE MORTGAGE SWAPS
The FHLBB needed a way to get cash to its constituent thrifts
without violating its own regulations. In order to accomplish
both goals, the Bank Board had to comply with the spirit of
its regulations while also finding available funds for its thrifts.
From the Board's perspective, its net worth regulations were
meant to ensure that each thrift maintained an adequate financial
position, and this goal was met so long as the thrifts kept their
original loan portfolios. This was because those holdings met
the regulations' standards when the loans were made, despite
the fact that their value had changed over time. On the other
hand, an actual sale for less than acquisition value would not
provide this assurance because it would force the Board to use
the new selling price when calculating a thrift's net worth. In
the highly charged banking market, no sale could provide the
needed amounts. Thus, the Board could not consider sales
because they would change the thrifts' financial positions in a
way not approved by the Board's regulations.
At the same time that the market made sales unattractive
from a regulatory perspective, it also made them a poor economic
choice because the number of potential buyers was limited and
the likely selling price was low. Yet, even in hard times there
remained at least one attractive cash cow-the United States
Treasury. Through the Internal Revenue Service ("Service," or
"IRS"), the government would have to give the thrifts substantial
tax refunds if the thrifts' economic losses were transformed into
deductible tax losses. Unfortunately, at least from the Bank
Board's perspective, something more than a mere decline in
value was needed to produce a tax deduction. In general, that
something more was a sale or exchange of the depressed property,
known in tax parlance as a "realization event.' ' 6 Hence, it
seemed that the FHLBB was caught in an untenable situation.
If the thrifts wanted refunds, they would have to dispose of
14. 890 F.2d 848 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 40 (1990).
15. See supra notes 5 to 7.
16. B. BrrrKER & M. MCMAHON, supra note 11, 3.2.
Winter 1991]
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their loans. But, if they disposed of the loans, their economic
condition would change, forcing the Board to reduce their net
worth. Thus, the Board needed a way to create a realization
event for tax purposes that did not change the thrifts' economic
condition under the regulations. To this end, the Board developed
the concept of "substantially identical" mortgages.
The Bank Board knew that the Internal Revenue Service would
demand a disposition before granting a deduction. Sales were
unacceptable because they changed a thrift's economic standing.
Most exchanges were also problematic because they threatened
to change a thrift's risk of repayment, which the Board saw as
tantamount to a change in economic condition. 7 However,
trades were tolerable if the exchanged loans carried the same
economic risk. With matched risks, the Board hoped to achieve
a realization event while avoiding an economic event.
The Board knew that it was possible to match loans by
computer. Matched loans could standardize risk, thus leaving
thrifts in the same economic condition as before an exchange.
Of course, exchanging substantially identical loans would serve
no business purpose if thrifts were in the same economic position
both before and after the trade. However, the swaps would
serve a tax purpose by providing a realization event. Thus, what
looked foolish from a business perspective became ingenious tax
planning. If the scheme worked, the thrifts would maintain their
economic positions while still obtaining large cash infusions from
tax refunds.
In its search for substantially identical loans, the Board went
about the business of quantifying risk. It determined that there
were three types of risks in any loan: credit (the ability to collect
on the loan); rate (the future earning potential of the loan); and
repayment (the extent of principal repayments and prepayments
expected from the loan). 8 It further determined that these risks
would coincide if thrifts swapped bundles of loans which met
ten criteria. The Board's requirements were that each package
of loans would:
17. A changed risk of repayment would result, for example, if a thrift
gave up a loan due in 10 years paying 12% for a loan due in seven years
paying 8%.
18. San Antonio Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577, 580 (6th Cir.
1989) (citing FHLBB Mem. R-49 (June 27, 1980)).
[Vol. 22
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1. involve single-family residential mortgages,
2. be of a similar type (for example, conventionals for conven-
tionals or adjustables for adjustables),
3. have the same stated maturity (e.g., thirty years),
4. have identical interest rates,
5. have similar remaining terms to maturity,
6. have aggregate principal amounts within the lesser of 2 1/2
percent or $100,000 (plus or minus) on both sides of the trans-
action, with any additional consideration being paid in cash,
7. be sold without recourse,
8. have similar fair market values,
9. have similar loan-to-value ratios at the time of the exchange,
and
10. have all security properties for both sides of the transaction
in the same state. 9
When these ten standards were met, the Board would not require
a recalculated net worth but, with luck, the Internal Revenue
Service would allow the deductions and grant the refunds.
Shortly after the Bank Board issued its Memorandum R-49
setting out the scheme described above, many thrifts began
trading substantially identical mortgages. 2° After the trades, the
thrifts reported losses equal to the difference between their
original acquisition values and the fair market values of the
loans they received. These losses were then used to apply for
substantial tax refunds. All of these refunds were denied by the
Internal Revenue Service, which claimed that the exchanges did
not meet Congress' requirements for creating deductible losses. 2'
III. TIm INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DENIES THE
DEDUCTIONS
The Internal Revenue Service did not look kindly on the
mortgage swaps. In fact, it refused to allow loss deductions as a
result of the trades. By disallowing the deductions, the Service
negated the sought-after tax refunds. The reason for the Service's
resistance is easily understood if we acknowledge its view of
income taxation.
19. Id. at 579.
20. Id. at 580.
21. Id.
Winter 1991 ]
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Economic reality and tax reality do not always coincide. For
example, an economist would tell us that a person has income
when he holds property originally purchased for $100 which is
now worth $100,0002 Most of us would agree with the economist
and find that the person is significantly wealthier than when he
began. For the most part, however, our income tax system would
leave this taxpayer unscathed because, in general, income taxation
is transaction driven. Hence, when there is no transaction, there
is no tax even when the investment's value increases in the
taxpayer's hands. 23 Further, even in this transaction-driven system,
there are times when taxpayers can dispose of property and still
avoid or defer a tax.2 For the Service, our transaction-driven tax
system means that taxpayers hold most of the cards when it
comes to tax planning because they control both the deals they
enter into and when those deals are made. Without some limit
on this taxpayer control, manipulations would rule the system.
The amulet protecting the Service from taxpayer manipulation
is the economic consequences associated with most investments.
The Service hopes these monetary risks will discourage taxpayers
from engaging in purely tax motivated transactions. Yet, if
economic risk serves as a shield, mortgage swaps come dangerously
close to an IRS nightmare-tax benefits without economic risk.
A swap of substantially identical mortgages gives thrifts complete
control over their taxation by creating tax benefits without
economic disincentives. To avoid this result, the Service developed
a rationale for denying the deductions based on the Code's
requirements for allowing losses.
IV. THE CODE REQUIREMENTS FOR DEDUCTIBLE LossEs
Under the Code, three events are required before an economic
loss becomes a tax loss. The three events are realization, 25
recognition, 26 and allowance.27
22. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
23. There are exceptions to this general rule. For example, original issue
discount bonds and market discount bonds are sometimes taxed on increases in
value even without realization. I.R.C. §§ 1272-1273, 1276 (1988).
24. For a discussion of the deferral or exclusion of gain see B. BrrrKER &
M. MCMAHON, supra note 11, 5, 27 (gifts and nonrecognition transactions).
25. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 1967).
26. I.R.C. § 1001(c).
27. Id. § 165.
358 [Vol. 22
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All realized losses are recognized unless the Code specifically
avoids recognition.2 Therefore, so long as the swaps effect
realization, recognition follows as a matter of course. Because
there is no Code section that denies recognition to mortgage
swaps, 29 the IRS challenge to the thrifts' deductions is based on
the concepts of realization and allowance.
V. REALzATION
Income taxation rarely tracks economic increases and decreases
in wealth because economic sea changes present difficult timing
issuesA0 For example, how would we tax the fluctuating value
of a share that is quoted at $25 at 10 A.M., $23 at noon and
$30 at closing? Instead of tracking economic performance, and
in deference to its transaction model, the Code gives the taxpayer
three hurdles to jump in order to convert his economic loss into
a tax loss. Hence, a loss must be (1) realized before it is (2)
recognized and (3), finally, allowed as a deduction.
Given the importance of realization, one would expect that
the Code would define the concept precisely. Yet, realization is
only briefly discussed in Treasury regulation 1.1001-1(a), which
tells us that "gain or loss ... from the exchange of property
for other property differing materially either in kind or in extent,
is treated as income or as loss sustained." '31 Further, little has
been written on the topic, 32 and most of the realization cases
28. Id. § 1001(c).
29. Section 1031 provides nonrecognition treatment for like kind exchanges.
However, the section does not apply to exchanges of bonds, notes or evidences
of indebtedness. Id. § 1031(a)(2)(B)-(C). Section 1091 provides nonrecognition
when substantially identical stock or securities are traded within 30 days, but
this section does not reach mortgage exchanges either. Id. § 1091(a).
30. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115-16 (1940).
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1953) (emphasis added).
32. For a general discussion of the realization requirement, see B. BrrrKER
& L. LOKXEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES Ain GIFTs 5.2 (2d
ed. 1989) and the cases and articles discussed therein. For a recent article on
realization, see White, Realization, Recognition, Reconciliation, Rationality
and the Structure of the Federal Income Tax System, 88 MICH. L. Rnv. 2034(1990). For a discussion of realization in the mortgage swap area from the
perspective of the taxpayer's attorney, see Bacon, S&L Loan Swaps at the
Supreme Court: Ripple Effects, 49 TAx NOTES 1121 (Dec. 3, 1990); Lusby,
Loan Swaps: On the Road to Proper Tax Treatment, LEGAL BuLL. 155 (July
1988); LeFevere, Tax Treatment of Reciprocal Mortgage Sales, 31 Tax Mgmt.
(BNA) 167 (June 4, 1990); Comment, Reciprocal Mortgage Sales: A Question
of Realization, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 135 (1989).
Winter 1991 ]
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date back to the 1920s.13 As a result of this lack of guidance,
mortgage swaps force us to revisit this old and well established
concept.
A. Realization Theories
The mortgage swap strategy has spawned two realization
theories. Both theories acknowledge that a true economic loss
is required for realization, i.e., that the property must have
actually declined in value. Both theories also agree that a
transaction is needed to create a tax loss. This transaction model
avoids the timing problems created by reliance on economic loss
alone by providing an event that fixes the time to determine tax
consequences. Where the theories diverge is on whether realization
requires only an economic loss followed by a disposition or
whether a third step is also needed. That third step is an
exchange of materially different properties.
1. Economic Loss Followed by Disposition (Fixed
Transactions)
For the Sixth Circuit,3 one district court, 3 and a minority of
the tax courts,3 6 only two steps are required for realization: an
33. See Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925) (stock in corporation
of one state exchanged for stock in another corporation from a different
state); Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 (1924) (corporate reorganization and
admittance of new shareholders); Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134 (1923)
(corporate reorganization and transfer of stock); Rockefeller v. United States,
257 U.S. 176 (1921) (two corporations form a separate corporation); United
States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921) (trade of stock and assets between New
Jersey and Delaware corporations); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)
(stock dividends); Mutual Loan & Say. Co. v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 161
(5th Cir. 1950) (bond exchange); Girard Trust Co. v. United States, 166 F.2d
773 (3d Cir. 1948) (exchange of municipal bonds); Emery v. Commissioner,
166 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1948) (same); Schoenberg v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 446
(8th Cir. 1935) (purchase of stock by controlled corporation followed by sale
to controlling shareholder), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 586 (1936); C.M. Hall
Lamp Co. v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Mich. 1951) (bond
exchange); West Missouri Power Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 105 (1952)
(same); Home v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 250 (1945) (sale and repurchase of a
seat on the stock exchange); Hanlin v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 811 (1938),
aff'd, 108 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1939).
34. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 890 F.2d 848 (6th Cir. 1989),
cert. granted, 1ll S. Ct. 40 (1990).
35. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Temple v. United States, 694 F.
Supp. 230 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1989).
36. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 372 (1988), rev'd, 890
F.2d 848 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, Ill S. Ct. 40 (1990).
[Vol. 22
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economic loss followed by a disposition through which the
taxpayer relinquishes his control over the property. As Judge
Smith tells us in First Federal Savings & Loan Association of
Temple v. United States ("Temple"): "First, one asks the
question, 'Has Temple suffered a real economic loss, or more
specifically, has Temple experienced a change in the net worth
of the asset(s) in question?' . . . Second, one asks, 'Has there
been a sale or other disposition of the property which has
declined in value?' ' 37
This limit on realization to economic loss followed by
disposition has two justifications. Courts that adopt the narrow
view believe that the Code supports their position. For them,
the language of Treasury regulation 1.1001-1(a) simply tells us
how to calculate a loss without providing for additional
conditions."' Taxpayers assert a second justification for limiting
the question to a search for dispositions: The disposition test
provides a bright line for taxpayers, courts, and the Service in
accordance with the administrative needs which first led to the
realization concept.3 9
2. Material Difference
While some courts are content to limit realization to an
economic loss followed by a disposition, other courts seek
something else besides. They too want an actual decline in value
37. 694 F. Supp. at 239-40.
38. As Judge Cohen stated:
[The] regulation could have, but does not state that income or loss is
only sustained upon "exchange of property for other property differing
materially either in kind or in extent"; prior regulations containing such
a requirement have not been carried forward in the current regulation;
and the converse of a true statement is not necessarily true. Respondent
contends that the regulation means that the gain or loss realized from the
exchange of property for other property not differing materially either in
kind or extent is not treated as income or loss. I believe that the regulation
deals with computation of gain or loss and not with whether gain or loss
will be realized or recognized.
Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 372, 403 (1988) (Cohen, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Accord First Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n of Temple v. United States, 694 F. Supp. 230, 240 (W.D. Tex.
1988); Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 890 F.2d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 1989).
39. Bacon, supra note 32, at 1122.
Winter 1991 ]
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followed by an exchange, but only if the exchange is of materially
different properties. What "material difference" means, and
why it should serve as a necessary aspect of realization, is the
subject of this section.
a. Material difference as economic substitution
One problem with the material difference concept is that the
term does not have the same meaning for all those who have
looked at the issue. For some, material difference asks whether
there is economic identity between the traded properties at the
time of the exchange. 40 Using this standard, material difference
under the Code cannot coexist with the substantially identical
mortgages created under FHLBB Memorandum R-49. As
explained by Judge Smith:
When it is established that Memorandum R-49's very purpose for
existing was to fashion a transaction that involves the exchange
of what are in essence economic substitutes for one another ...
it becomes almost ludicrous to suggest that R-49 loans are at the
same time "substantially identical" for financial accounting pur-
poses and "materially different" for tax accounting purposes....
The economic reality here is that loans which meet the criteria of
Memorandum R-49 are economic substitutes for one an-
other .... 41
b. Material difference limited by fungibility
Other courts are less exacting in their use of the material
difference standard. For them, all that is required for material
difference is that the exchanged properties not be identical,
fungible commodities. 4 Under this standard, there is no material
difference when Farmer A exchanges 1,000 bushels of Kansas
40. Centennial Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 1389,
1398-1400 (N.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 887 F.2d 595
(5th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 40 (1990); First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n of Temple v. United States, 694 F. Supp. 230, 242-48 (W.D. Tex. 1988),
aff'd, 887 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1989).
41. 694 F. Supp. at 245.
42. San Antonio Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577, 586 (5th Cir.
1989).
[Vol. 22
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spring wheat for Farmer B's 1,000 bushels of Kansas spring
wheat,' 3 but, there is material difference when Bank A and Bank
B exchange substantially identical mortgages. For the courts that
use the fungible commodity standard, substantially identical
mortgages for FHLBB regulatory accounting purposes are not
identical, fungible commodities because the mortgages have
different obligors and are secured by different properties."
Although FHLBB Memorandum R-49 sought to standardize
each thrift's risk in a number of ways, it could not change the
fact that each loan was to different homeowners and was secured
by a unique piece of property. True, at the time of the exchange
each loan was current and all the properties were located in the
same states. However, those similarities could not ensure that
each home would retain its value or that each borrower would
continue to pay on his mortgage loan. These disparities became
apparent when the loans did not perform in exactly the same
way after the exchanges. For the courts that use the fungible
commodity approach, these changes in performance are
predictable proof that the swapped mortgages are not identical. 4
Thus, courts that adopt the fungible commodity approach to
the material difference standard have no problem holding that
mortgage swaps trigger realization.
VI. EVALUATING THE REALIZATION THEORIEs
Clearly, the fixed transaction view of realization clashes with
the material difference requirement, whether that standard
compels us to look at economic substitution or the more limited
fungible commodity criterion. This conflict leads to the question:
Which realization theory is best suited to our income tax system?
A. The Fixed Transaction Approach Is Too Limited
The fixed transaction approach places no limits on realization
through meaningless exchanges. Rewarding meaningless exchanges
is a serious flaw because it allows taxpayers to manipulate our
43. Id. at 583.
44. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Commissioner, 896 F.2d 580, 584(D.C. Cir. 1990); San Antonio Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577,
587 (5th Cir. 1989).
45. 896 F.2d at 584; 887 F.2d at 587.
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tax system's transaction model. To illustrate this point, let us
return to the farmers holding spring wheat. Assume that in
April the market for wheat has fallen, although it is expected
to pick up next year. Farmer A decides to store his wheat until
it increases in value, at which point he will sell it and register
a profit. Farmer A has no tax loss this year. Instead, he has to
live with the economic decline in his property's value until he
sells the grain. Further, if the price of wheat actually rises next
year, Farmer A will have a gain instead of a loss, which will
force him to pay tax instead of receiving a refund.
Using the fixed transaction approach without the additional
material difference requirement, Farmers B and C trade their
crops in April and claim a tax loss." They use this tax loss to
decrease their taxable income and apply for and receive a tax
refund. When the market for wheat increases in January, they
sell their grain at a profit and pay tax on the gain.
What is it about these two transactions that requires different
tax treatment? The answer is nothing. The transactions are too
similar to produce different tax results. The trade between
Farmers B and C is a meaningless exchange which should not
produce a tax loss. Because there is no significant difference
between Farmers A, B, and C they should all receive the same
tax treatment. Yet, the fixed transaction model requires disparate
treatment because Farmers B and C have exchanged their fungible
commodities and Farmer A has not.
One argument in support of the fixed transaction approach
to realization is that section 1001(a) is merely a computation
section with no effect on realization. 47 This assertion misses an
important part of the history of the material difference model.
Even if the regulations are wrong and the Code itself fails to
articulate a separate material difference standard, case law dating
back to the 1920s supports a material difference requirement
for realization.
The classic case in this regard is Eisner v. Macomber," in
which the Supreme Court prevented the Service from taxing
46. This example is based on the Fifth Circuit's analysis in San Antonio
Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1989).
47. Cottage Say. Bank Ass'n v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 372, 403-04 (1988)
(Cohen, J., concurring), rev'd, 890 F.2d 848, 850-52 (6th Cir. 1989), cert.
granted, III S. Ct. 40 (1990).
48. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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gain derived from a stock dividend. There the taxpayer maintained
her same percentage ownership in the company, although she
had many more stock certificates. When, as part of a
reorganization, shareholders exchanged certificates in Corporation
A for the same ownership interest in Corporation B, and B
continued A's business and remained in the same state, the
Court once again found no realization.49 In both of these cases,
the taxpayers were in the same position before and after the
exchange. True, they held different pieces of paper, but those
papers continued to represent their unchanged interests in the
same underlying assets. In contrast, where taxpayers received
shares in a new company which was incorporated in a different
state, the Court found material difference and taxed the gain
because each state's unique laws created distinct shareholder
rights and obligations.50 All these decisions, and many more like
them, rest on the view that, in an exchange, a taxpayer must
receive something different from the thing transferred before
realization occurs. 51
B. The Economic Substitute Theory Is Too Broad
The economic substitute approach to material difference asks
us to look at the risks associated with each investment. This
technique also overrides the transaction model of income taxation.
For example, trading an A.T.& T. bond for an I.B.M. bond is
not a meaningless exchange because the taxpayer has received
something substantially different for the property he tendered
iMj return.5 2 Yet, it is possible that each bond shares the same
rating for economic risk. Using the economic substitute view of
material difference, this exchange does not create a realization
event because one bond is an economic substitute for the other.
This is true even though the taxpayer has not engaged in a
meaningless transaction. Yet, a transaction-based tax system
should be able to distinguish between the wheat swap and the
49. Id. at 193. See also Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 (1924) (no realization
when reorganized corporation substantially maintains corporate identity).
50. Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536, 541 (1925).
51. See supra note 33 for cases discussing material difference standard.
52. This example is based on the Fifth Circuit's analysis in San Antonio
Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577, 590 (5th Cir. 1989).
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bond swap. Otherwise, transactions become useless as a trigger
for income taxation.
C. The Fungible Commodity Approach Is the Correct
Standard
Of the three theories, the use of fungible commodities as a
way of defining material difference is the best approach to the
realization dilemma. On the one hand, it maintains the integrity
of transactions as the trigger for taxation because any exchange,
except an exchange of identical property, will suffice to trigger
realization. On the other hand, it protects the tax system from
manipulation through meaningless exchanges by prohibiting trades
of fungible commodities.
In addition to maintaining our transaction model of income
taxation, the fungible commodity standard also survives general
objections to the material difference standard. Thus, in contrast
to the economic substitute model, this approach provides a
bright line test for taxpayers, courts, and the Service.
Another objection to the material difference view of realization
is that it destroys the meaning of section 1001(c), which requires
recognition unless a Code provision specifically provides
otherwise. For those who support this view, if section 1001(a)
already prevents realization for trades of non-materially different
properties, then other nonrecognition provisions (such as the
wash sale rules of section 1091 and the like kind exchange rules
of section 1031) are "an absurd effort in futility.153 After all,
why would Congress create several nonrecognition provisions
when realization was already in place to prevent tax consequences?
This interpretation of section 1001(a) is based on an inappropriate
reading of the material difference standard.
The material difference standard is not a super realization
provision. Rather, this minimum measure provides the floor
(instead of a ceiling) for judging transactions. Thus, for example,
using the identical property approach, the material difference
standard would not prevent realization when a taxpayer trades
a copyright of Beloved54 for a copyright of The Spook Who Sat
53. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Temple v. United States, 694. F.
Supp. 230, 247 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1989).
54. T. MosmusoN, BELOVED (1987).
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by the Door," because novels are not fungible commodities.
Yet, this swap would receive nonrecognition under section 1031
as an exchange of like kind properties.56
VII. ALLOWANCE AS A REQUIREMENT FOR A Loss DEDUCTION
If realization requires material difference and material
difference is the opposite of economic substitution, then the
attempted deductions must fail because the exchanged mortgages
cannot be both substantially identical and materially different.
However, under the other two realization theories, there is still
some hope of achieving a deduction.
Thus, if all realization requires is a fixed transaction, as
asserted by the tax court minority,5 7 the Temple district court,5"
and the Sixth Circuit,5 9 then realization is achieved because the
exchanged mortgages actually declined in value and were disposed
of in fixed transactions. 60  Further, recognition is also
accomplished because Code section 1001(c) tells us that realized
losses are always recognized unless the Code specifically provides
otherwise. 6'
Using the fungible commodity test of realization, the mortgage
swaps also meet the first two criteria for obtaining a tax loss.
Realization is accomplished because: (1) the exchanged mortgages
actually declined in value; (2) the thrifts disposed of the
depreciated debts in bona fide transactions; and (3) the traded
properties were materially different, as demonstrated by the fact
that each loan was made to distinct borrowers who provided
unique security.62 Here too, recognition follows realization under
Code section 1001(c).
55. S. GREENLEE, THE SPooK WHO SAT BY THE DOOR (1990).
56. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-(c)(3), 55 Fed. Reg. 17,635 (to be codified
at 26 C.F.R. pt. 101) (proposed Apr. 26, 1990).
57. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 372, 403-04 (1988)
(Cohen, J., concurring), rev'd, 890 F.2d 848 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. granted,
111 S. Ct. 40 (1990).
58. 684 F. Supp. 230, 242-48 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 593 (5th
Cir. 1989).
59. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 890 F.2d 848, 852 (6th Cir.
1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 40 (1990).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 34-45.
61. I.R.C. § 1001(c) (1988).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
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Because these two theories find realization in the mortgage
swap area, the question now becomes whether the realized and
recognized losses are allowed under the Code. To answer this
query, we must turn to section 165.
Code section 165(a) tells us that, in.general, losses are allowed
in the year sustained if not compensated by insurance or
otherwise. 6 This section is modified by regulations that state:
"Only a bona fide loss is allowable. Substance and not mere
form shall govern in determining a deductible loss." 4 Once
again, courts that have looked at mortgage swaps do not agree
on what this language means or how it affects the thrifts' ability
to receive a deduction.
A. Section 165 Does Not Apply to the Mortgage Swaps
The tax court, 65 the Temple district court," the District of
Columbia Circuit,67 and the Fifth Circuit" all believe that section
165 does not apply to mortgage swaps because, for these courts,
section 165 is concerned only with preventing deductions arising
from manufactured losses. As long as the traded property has
actually suffered a decline in value, section 165 is satisfied. It
is only when taxpayers construct illusory losses which lack
economic substance that section 165 steps in to disallow the
deduction.6
63. I.R.C. § 165(a) (1988).
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-2(b) (1953).
65. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 372, 401-02 (1988),
rev'd, 890 F.2d 848 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 40 (1990).
66. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Temple v. United States, 694 F.
Supp. 230, 248-49 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1989).
67. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Commissioner, 896 F.2d 580, 584
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
68. San Antonio Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577, 592-93 (5th
Cir. 1989).
69. As Judge Smith tells us:
Section 165 ... is concerned solely with the truth or reality ... of a
claimed economic loss. It does not speak to the situation, encountered
here, where a real economic loss has occurred but the "identifiable event
fixing the loss" (the exchange), in effect, simply substitutes economically
equivalent assets.... In short, Sections 165 and 1001(a) simply were not
intended to speak to the aspect of deducting losses presented by this case.
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Temple v. United States, 694 F. Supp. 230,
248 n.19 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1989).
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For example, suppose a taxpayer is approached by a broker
with the following proposal: For a small fee, I will take your
cash and invest it in commodities; if the investment increases in
value, I will keep the gain; if it declines in value, I will make
good on the loss; in the first year, I promise to reduce your
taxes by generating deductible tax losses for your account; in
the second year, your taxes will also decline as I pass you a
capital gain; in any event, your principal is protected. 70
For those courts that see section 165 as a barrier against
ersatz loss deductions, this transaction is unacceptable and
disallowed. But, for these same courts, the mortgage swaps do
not fall to this level of deceit. Instead, the mortgage swaps
survive section 165's gauntlet because the trades are of actually
depreciated loans. Further, the exchanges are valid because the
benefits and burdens associated with each property were actually
transferred as a result of the swaps. 71 Thus, if section 165 is
concerned solely with the truth or reality of a claimed economic
loss, it does not apply where a real economic loss has occurred.72
As long as the losses exist independent of the transactions, the
deduction is allowed.
B. Section 165 Provides an Independent Test for Allowance
While the tax court, the Temple district court, the District of
Columbia Circuit, and the Fifth Circuit find no need to apply
section 165 to mortgage swaps, the Sixth Circuit holds a different
view. For the Sixth Circuit, section 165 articulates a concept
underlying all loss deduction provisions-that before a loss is
allowed the taxpayer must show some business purpose for
entering into a transaction. 73 This business purpose is shown not
by the taxpayer's motive, but by the economic substance of the
transaction.
70. This example is based on the facts of Yosha v. Commissioner, 861
F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1988), which is discussed by the Fifth Circuit in San
Antonio Say. v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577, 592 (5th Cir. 1989).
71. See Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 372, 401-02 (1988),
rev'd, 890 F.2d 848 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 40 (1990).
72. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Temple v. United States, 694 F.
Supp. 230, 248 n.19 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1989).
73. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 890 F.2d 848, 853-54 (6th Cir.
1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 40 (1990).
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The Sixth Circuit believes that Congress would not create a
tax that both imposes a liability and then allows its own
circumvention without resort to some transaction that carries
economic consequences. 74 Thus, the economic substance
requirement that the Sixth Circuit finds in section 165 is a
shorthand definition of business purpose. Would this transaction
take place absent tax benefit? Are there times when a taxpayer
might swap substantially identical mortgages even if the exchange
produced a taxable gain?
Where the taxpayer's economic position remains stable after
the transaction, the only purpose for the exchange becomes the
desired tax result. In this situation, the loss is not allowed
because "we cannot suppose that it was part of the purpose of
the act to provide an escape from the liabilities that it sought
to impose." ' 75 Under this approach, mere decline in value is not
enough to force an allowance. Rather, the taxpayer must show
that the exchange that created the tax loss might have occurred
even in a tax free world. If the thrifts would never swap
mortgages absent the tax advantage, then the transactions lack
economic substance and are not allowed.
VIII. BusINEss PURPOSE AS A REQUIREMENT FOR ALLOWING A
Loss DEDUCTION
The conflict between the Sixth Circuit and other courts
concerning the scope of section 165 raises the question: "Does
the Code require a business purpose as a condition for granting
the loss deductions?" The answer to that question is yes.
We know for example that, at the very least, the Code favors
business deductions over personal deductions. This is the clear
meaning derived from contrasting section 162 (which allows
deductions for ordinary and necessary business expenses) and
section 262 (which disallows deductions for personal, living and
family expenses). But why does the Code embody this favoritism?
At least one reason is that legitimate business deductions allow
us to avoid taxing people on the funds they expend to earn
74. 890 F.2d at 853-54.
75. Id. (quoting Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 410-11 (2d Cir.
1957) (Hand, J., dissenting)).
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income. 76 But, there is another reason as well. We do not want
people to completely control their own taxation, as would occur
if all expenditures produced deductions. Presumably, business
expenses are incurred in an attempt to produce profits. This
motivation then provides a failsafe protection against
manipulation, because business, by its very nature, carries with
it economic risk. To expunge this risk from a determination of
tax consequences would completely destroy the government's
revenue raising ability by encouraging taxpayers to orchestrate
their tax effects at will. A business purpose requirement is needed
to avoid this result.
One area where business purpose is fully developed is in the
corporate tax arena. In general, corporations are separate
taxpayers from their shareholders. 77 This separate taxation creates
an opportunity to exploit the tax system by passing income from
a shareholder to a corporation or from a corporation to a
shareholder. One way that courts avoid this maneuvering is by
mandating that corporations serve a business purpose before
they are treated as distinct taxpayers.78 If the corporation serves
a business purpose, then the public fisc has its first line of
defense-the market with all its hazards and opportunities will
keep taxpayers from blithely constructing deductions.
The potential to maneuver is present in the litigated mortgage
swaps by virtue of FHLBB Memorandum R-49. By matching
loans to the point that they are economic equivalents in the
taxpayers' eyes, the Memorandum encourages thrifts to enter
into transactions that they would not conceive of for business
reasons. Yet, there are numerous objections to applying the
business purpose requirement in this area.
76. We would not, for example, want to tax someone on the cost of his
inventory in the following situation: Alphonse purchases a dish for $2 and
sells it for $3. By allowing a deduction for the cost of the product, we can
limit Alphonse's taxable income to $1 (the profit derived from the sale) rather
than to the entire $3 received.
77. H. ARnR&Ms & R. DoERNBERO, FEDERAL Cosu'oATE TAXATION 1 (2d
ed. 1990) (basic premise underlying Subchapter C is that a corporation should
be a taxpayer distinct from its shareholders).
78. See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39(1943); Rands, Organizations Classified as Corporations for Federal Tax
Purposes, 59 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 657 (1985).
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A. Business Purpose Creates Uncertainty
One objection to including a business purpose test under
section 165 is that this additional factor creates uncertainty
because the thrifts cannot know how much economic motivation
is needed to meet the standard. 9 This objection assumes that
the test sets a high and unduly sophisticated threshold that is
difficult to reach. Yet, including the business purpose model
within section 165 does not mean that mortgage swaps can never
create deductible losses. For example, the business purpose view
of section 165 should allow a deduction on the facts presented
by Federal National Mortgage Association v. Commissioner.°
The Federal National Mortgage Association ("FNMA") is a
private corporation subject to regulation by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). Its primary function
is to provide liquidity for mortgage investments by purchasing
mortgages from lenders." Under HUD's regulations, the FNMA
was told to reduce the number of loans it held that were secured
by rural properties . 2 It was also directed to increase its portfolio
of urban mortgages. 83 To accomplish its mandate to support the
struggling savings and loan industry, FNMA was attracted to
the mortgage swap arena.84 For business purposes, it also sought
ways to increase both its customer base and its holdings of due-
on-sale mortgages. 85 All these factors drew FNMA towards
mortgage swaps.
The principal market for mortgage swaps was among
institutions subject to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
Thus, although it did not answer to FHLBB regulations, FNMA
engaged in swaps of substantially identical mortgages as defined
by FHLBB Memorandum R-49. Because much of FNMA's
inventory was as depreciated as the debt held by the savings
and loans, it claimed deductible losses as a result of the trades.
Because those trades involved substantially identical mortgages,
the requested refunds fell under the same cloud that darkened
the savings and loans.
79. Bacon, supra note 32, at 1131.
80. 896 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
81. Id. at 582.
82. Id. at 583.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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When presented with these facts, the District of Columbia
Circuit accepted the limited view of section 165, which holds
that the section's power is restricted to attacking illusory losses.86
Thus, it allowed the deductions under these circumstances as it
would have even if tax benefit was the sole motive for the
transaction.87 Yet, these facts are significantly different from
the other mortgage swap cases. Here, FNMA should receive a
deduction even using the Sixth Circuit's stricter analysis.
FNMA would survive the Sixth Circuit's business purpose test
because the swaps satisfied at least some legitimate non-tax
related business purpose; apparently, FNMA might well have
traded mortgages in a tax free world. Other thrifts might meet
this standard as well. Unfortunately, with the exception of the
Sixth and D.C. Circuits, courts that have looked at this issue
cannot make this determination because the taxpayers did not
reveal their business purposes for engaging in the trade if, in
fact, there were any.
B. The Business Purpose Test Creates a Super Wash Sale
Rule
Section 1091 denies loss deduction where a taxpayer sells or
otherwise disposes of "stock or securities" and, within thirty
days before or after the event, acquires "substantially identical"
stock or securities." Because mortgages are not stock or securities,
section 1091 does not apply to the mortgage swaps. By using
section 165 to attack these trades, so the argument goes, the
Service is creating a new section 1091 without congressional
mandate. 89 This contention is further bolstered by reference to
section 56(g)(4)(E), which disallows seventy-five percent of all
losses resulting from "the exchange of any pool of debt
obligations for another pool of debt obligations having
substantially the same effective interest rates and maturities"
when corporations calculate their alternative minimum tax
obligations.9 By disallowing some, but not all, of the losses
86. Id. at 584.
87. Id.
88. I.R.C. § 1091(a) (1988).
89. Petitioner's Brief at 23-24, Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, No.
89-1965 (Oct. Term 1990) (filed Nov. 15, 1990).
90. Id.
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(and then only for purposes of the alternative minimum tax),
Congress has shown that it means to allow losses for mortgage
swaps under the regular tax.91
This position suffers from the same flaws contained in the
claim that the inclusion of a material difference facet in the
realization requirement is an inappropriate addition to the like
kind exchange rule of section 1031.92 The two rules serve unique
purposes that can easily coexist.
Section 1091 is limited to exchanges of securities. Its thirty-
day rule evidences Congress' view that shares of stock in the
same company are substantially identical within any given thirty-
day period. The section does not tell us whether a trade outside
the thirty-day period has a business purpose. We can presume
that such trades do reflect the taxpayer's read of the economic
climate, but the section itself leaves this query to other hands.
Further, section 1091, by its very nature, has no application to
the mortgage swaps because those debts are not stock or securities,
which is all that section addresses.
The resort to section 56 is also unwarranted. First, subsection
56(g)(4)(E) was not in effect at the time the mortgage swaps
were made. 93 Further, section 56(g)(4)(E) is limited to debt
obligations that have substantially the same effective interest
rates and maturities.9 As pointed out by Judge Cohen, the
opposite of a true statement is not always also true.95 Thus, it
does not follow that if section 56 does not attack losses from
trades of debt under the alternative minimum tax, then these
losses are immune from attack under the regular tax. In addition,
section 56(g)(4)(E) relates only to debt obligations that are
substantially identical for purposes of interest rates and maturity.
Under Memorandum R-49 the swapped mortgages are identical
in some eight other aspects as well.9 This. identity makes it
91. Id.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
93. Section 56(g)(4)(E) was added to the Code in 1986, some six years
after Memorandum R-49 first created the mortgage swap market. See Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
94. I.R.C. § 56(G)(4)(e) (1988).
95. Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 372, 403 (1988) (Cohen,
J. concurring), rev'd, 890 F.2d 848 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct.
40(1990).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
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harder to argue that a business purpose exists for the mortgage
exchanges, although such a purpose may well exist in other
cases.
C. Including Business Purpose in Section 165 Creates an
Administrative Nightmare
The business purpose test might well create an administrative
nightmare if that standard was equivalent to an economic
substitution test. To force taxpayers, courts, and the Service to
determine whether exchanged properties are the same, based on
some exalted view of the "market," demands a level of
sophistication that is probably beyond each group's ken.
However, when we limit the test to its original function-the
ferreting out of some legitimate business reason for engaging in
the transaction-the problem disappears. In fact, as indicated
above, courts have used the business purpose test in the corporate
tax area since the 1940s, and the anticipated nightmare has yet
to materialize.
D. Applying a Business Purpose Test Under Section 165
Creates a Different Rule for Recognizing Gains Than for
Recognizing Losses'
This argument is the strangest of all those advanced against
the use of the business purpose test, because it fails to
acknowledge that the entire Code imposes harsher rules for
deducting losses than for taxing gains. Although losses must be
realized, recognized, and allowed before they become deductions,
gains are taxed based on realization and recognition alone. There
is no additional allowance requirement for the taxation of gain.
The additional allowance requirement for the deduction of losses
reflects Congress' view that taxpayers are more prone to
manufacture losses than gains. This is true because losses create
deductions and deductions tend to work to the taxpayers'
advantage in a way that gains do not. Thus, if a harsher rule
for losses than for gains is a flaw in the tax system, that blemish
goes far beyond the transactions at issue in the mortgage swap
cases.
97. Bacon, supra note 32, at 1133.
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IX. CONCLUSION
In order to deduct a loss, a taxpayer must meet three separate
criteria: realization, recognition, and allowance.9 8 Although these
three conditions are explicitly mandated by the Code, no court
has correctly applied all three in the mortgage swap area.
All three tests are needed because each serves a unique purpose
in our tax system. Realization provides the proper moment to
engage the tax out of the endless series of possibilities created
by the sea changes of the economic market. Recognition allows
Congress to override its general timing principles when other
policies make such a change attractive. Allowance gives Congress
the opportunity to restrict deductions that do not further its
ideal of an economically based tax system, as, for example,
when a transaction serves no business purpose.
The realization standard is misapplied both by those courts
who hold that only an economic loss followed by a disposition
is needed to effect realization and by those who use material
difference as a synonym for economic substitution. The realization
standard is neither so narrow nor so broad. Instead, realization
is accomplished when property that has actually declined in
value is disposed of in a fixed transaction, and the property
received in return is not the transferred property's twin.
The allowance standard is misapplied when it is limited to an
attack on illusory losses; section 165 is more powerful than such
a position maintains. Rather, section 165 attacks both losses
without economic substance and transactions without business
purpose aside from possible tax advantage.
The proper questions to ask when judging whether mortgage
swaps create deductible losses are whether the swaps are:
(1) Realized. This is shown in the mortgage swap area because:
(a) the loans actually declined in value before the trades were
made; (b) the exchanges were fixed transactions in which the
thrifts gave up their rights in the traded properties; and (c) the
mortgages received were materially different from the transferred
mortgages because each loan had a distinct borrower and was
secured by unique property;
(2) Recognized. Under section 1001(c) the trades are recognized
98. I.R.C. §§ 1001(a), 1001(c), 165 (1988).
[Vol. 22
HeinOnline  -- 22 U. Tol. L. Rev. 376 1990-1991
SA VINGS AND LOAN CRISIS
because there is no Code section that prohibits recognition; and
(3) Allowed. A loss is allowed when the taxpayer demonstrates
that the transaction that purports to create the loss might have
occurred in a tax free world, i.e., that it has some legitimate
business purpose.
To date, each decision concerning the mortgage swaps has failed
to apply all three criteria correctly.
Some courts have stopped their analysis at realization because
they believed that the loans were not materially different,
rendering the losses unrealized.9 Yet, the loans were materially
different because they each were made to distinct borrowers and
were secured by unique properties.
Other courts have gone on to an allowance analysis but have
misapplied section 165 by limiting its powers to a search and
destroy mission for manufactured losses.00 This position fails
to acknowledge the broader mandate of the business purpose
test.
Even the Sixth Circuit, which properly applied section 165, is
wrong because it fails to accept the material difference standard
for realization.
What then is the correct result? Are the trades as created by
Memorandum R-49 appropriate paths to a loss deduction? The
answer to this question rests on whether the mortgage swaps
had any business purpose.
As noted above, the mortgage swaps pass the realization and
recognition hurdles to loss deductions because the traded loans
were materially different. What we need to know is whether
these trades also meet the business purpose test of section 165.
In all but Federal National Mortgage Association'0 and the
Sixth Circuit opinion in Cottage Savings Bank' 2 this question
99. Centennial Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 1389,
1398 (N.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 887 F.2d 595 (5th Cir.
1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 40 (1990).
100. See Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Commissioner, 896 F.2d 580
(D.C. Cir. 1990); San Antonio Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577
(5th Cir. 1989); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Temple v. United States,
694 F. Supp. 230 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1989);
Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 372 (1988), rev'd, 890 F.2d 848
(6th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, Il1 S. Ct. 40 (1990).
101. 90 T.C. 405 (1988), aff'd, 896 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
102. 890 F.2d 848 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 40 (1990).
Winter 1991]
HeinOnline  -- 22 U. Tol. L. Rev. 377 1990-1991
TOLEDO LA W REVIEW V
was not addressed. In Federal National Mortgage Association
the thrift was able to show a business purpose for its transactions
(even though the court would have granted the deduction absent
that showing) and the loss was allowed. 03 In Cottage Savings
Bank the thrift did not show a business purpose, and the loss
was denied. ' 4 Thus, the results in these two cases are correct
even if the reasoning of both decisions is flawed: the Sixth
Circuit's because it does not accept material difference and the
D.C. Circuit's because it does not accept business purpose.
In the other litigations, the question of business purpose was
never asked. Perhaps now as these cases travel to the Supreme
Court, that question will be answered.
103. 896 F.2d at 589.
104. 890 F.2d at 854-55.
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